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THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. By Donald E. Boles. Ames:
Iowa State University Press, 1961. Pp. Lx, 308. $4.95.
THIs book is written by a non-lawyer. Its author is a member of the political
science faculty at Iowa State University and Chairman of the Iowa Governor's
Commission on Human Relations. Unquestionably his analysis of the legal as-
pects of the problem of religion in the public schools leaves something to be
desired.1 Yet, if the book suffers from the deficiencies of non-legal authorship,
it also enjoys the benefits thereof. As a review of the reported decisions on the
subject it is far inferior to Johnson and Yost's Separation of Church and State
in the United States (1948), but it provides something not contained in that
book. The author realizes that the problem of religion in public education is not
merely one of law, constitutional, statutory or decisional, but one of interper-
sonal and intergroup relations as well. Indeed, it is on the non-legal note that
the book begins:
The Eighth Grade pupils of P.S. 7 gradually quiet down after the morn-
ing tardy bell has finished ringing. The teacher picks up a copy of the
King James Version of the Bible from her desk and announces, "We will
begin the school day by reading five verses of the Scriptures as is required
by state law." She opens the book and starts reading the Beatitudes from
the Book of Matthew in a flat voice. (The state law also requires that the
Bible be read without note or comment to avoid sectarian bias.) Harold,
the Jewish rabbi's son, squirms uncomfortably as he listens to the words
of the New Testament. Micky wonders uneasily about his parish priest's
remarks regarding the King James Bible of the Protestants. George, son
of "Freethinkers," sits scowling impatiently. Ann, listening intently, finds
several things that puzzle her in the reading, but knows that she cannot
ask questions, since the teacher is prohibited from commenting. The read-
ing is finished, the teacher replaces the book, and the atmosphere of the
classroom is cleared. But is it?
There is an air of simplicity about this presentation of the problem, yet there
is a basic validity to it. Even from a purely legalistic approach, the psycho-
logical consequences of religious practices in the public schools as they affect
1. For example:
The court [Hackett v. Brooksville Grade School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792
(1905)] concluded that neither the prayer nor Bible reading constituted sectarian instruc-
tion, since the children were not compelled to attend the exercises. P. 72.
The Kentucky constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled to attend any place
of worship," and a Kentucky statute forbids the teaching of any "sectarian ... doctrine"
in the public schools. The court held that neither of these provisions was violated. Ob-
viously, whether or not particular teaching is sectarian does not depend on whether chil-
dren are compelled to attend.
The author's lack of legal training constitutes inadequate excuse for some more egregious
errors. For example: "Judge Field [sic] dissented alone. He followed Justice Reed's opinion
in the McCollum case." P. 162. Judge Fuld did dissent in Zorach v. Clauson, 303 N.Y. 161,
100 N.E.2d 463 (1951), but he could hardly have followed Justice Reed's opinion in Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 33 U.S. 203 (1948), for Justice Reed dissented
because the Supreme Court invalidated the Champaign released time program while Judge
Fuld dissented because the New York Court of Appeals refused to invalidate the New
York City released time program.
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children of religious non-conformists are not irrelevant to a resolution of the
constitutional issues.2 There unfortunately does not appear to be any reported
research on the question and it still remains an area for useful and meaningful
investigation by social psychologists. There is, however, in some of the more
recent litigation sufficient opinion evidence by qualified psychologists to sup-
port the assumption that religious practices in the public schools result in some
psychological harm to many children of parents belonging to minority religions
or to no religion.3
This fact may entitle the child to be excused from participation in the re-
ligious practice, but does it require that the practice itself be eliminated? In
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4 the Supreme Court held
that children could not be compelled in violation of their conscience to salute
the flag or to pledge allegiance to it. This was all the relief sought by the plain-
tiffs; they did not demand that the practice be enjoined. Yet from the Court's
opinion it is quite clear that they would not have been entitled to such relief
had they sought it.5 Should not the same reasoning be applied to Bible read-
ing and other religious practices in the public schools-i.e., excuse the dissent-
ing child but permit the exercise for children wishing to participate?
The objection to this solution of the problem lies in the fact, supported by
creditable expert opinion,6 that the act of separating oneself from the school
community on religious grounds is itself likely to cause psychological harm to
many children of minority religions or no religion. But does even this fact re-
quire a court to enjoin Bible reading or other religious exercises in the public
schools? Must the schools refrain from teaching anything that might hurt the
religious sensibilities of some child? Is it required, for example, to refrain from
teaching the germ theory of disease simply because there is a Christian Scien-
tist child in the class who would be embarrassed and uncomfortable if it is
taught in his presence and equally embarrassed and uncomfortable if he were
excused from the room so that it might be taught in his absence? Justice Jack-
son, in his concurrence in People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education
recognized this dilemma in his remark that "it may be doubted whether the
Constitution, which, of course, protects the right to dissent, can be construed
also to protect one from the embarrassment that always attends nonconformity,
whether in religion, politics, behavior or dress." 7
Coupled with this dilemma is another, also recognized by Justice Jackson in
his concurrence in the McCollum case,--the dilemma of the reality of an edu-
2. See Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A2d 857 (1953), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 816 (1954) ; People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251
(1910).
3. See transcripts of trial testimony in Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100
A.2d 857 (1953) ; Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc. 2d 1015, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ;
Chamberlain v. Dade County School Board, Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida, Docket
No. 596428 (1961).
4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5. Id. at 630.
6. Supra note 3.
7. 333 U.S. 203 at 233 (1948).
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cation which sedulously avoids all reference to religion, one of the most impor-
tant realities of life. Said Justice Jackson:
Perhaps subjects such as mathematics, physics or chemistry are, or can be,
completely secularized. But it would not seem practical to teach either
practice or appreciation of the arts if we are to forbid exposure of youth
to any religious influences. Music without sacred music, architecture minus
the cathedral, or painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric
and incomplete, even from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational
appeal of religion in these guises is often stronger than in forthright ser-
mon. Even such a "science" as biology raises the issue between evolution
and creation as an explanation of our presence on this planet. Certainly a
course in English literature that omitted the Bible and other powerful uses
of our mother tongue for religious ends would be pretty barren. And I
should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of preparation
for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions have played
in the tragic story of mankind .... One can hardly respect a system of
education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of the currents of
religious thought that move the world society for a part in which he is
being prepared.8
While Professor Boles recognizes both dilemmas, he does not give them the
consideration they merit. Actually, they are not insoluble. The First Amend-
ment, though adopted before the era of compulsory universal education, does
not require the public school system to stultify itself by pretending that religion
does not exist. The Amendment sought only to establish in the responsibilities
of government a distinction between the sacred and the secular, between church
and state, and it commands only that all institutions of the state, including its
public school system, observe and honor that distinction. Of course, the dis-
tinction, like all human distinctions, cannot always be precise and exact. Un-
doubtedly there are instances-public school programs for teaching moral and
spiritual values is such a one-where both the sacred and the secular assert
reasonable claims of jurisdiction. But if the difficulty of division between what
is and what is not properly within government competence requires or justifies
a refusal to make a division, then the only alternatives are anarchy or totali-
tarianism.
The answer to the dilemma lies in the realization that religion itself may be
a secular subject. Nothing in the Constitution requires public school authorities
to remove all matter relating to religion from the curriculum. It does not, for
example, prohibit the study of the Bible as a work of literature, or the Missa
Solemnis as a work of music, or The Last Supper as a work of art. Nor does
it command that the influence of religion upon human history shall not be
taught. No violation of the First Amendment is involved in any of these since
literature, music, art and history are all secular subjects properly within the
competence of the public school teaching authorities.
It is to this type of teaching that Justice Jackson's remark concerning the
difficulties of dissenters is pertinent. A Jehovah's Witness child who refuses
to salute the flag (Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion in the Barnette
8. Id. at 235, 236.
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case) or a Christian Scientist child who refuses to attend the biology class may
suffer some embarrassment because of their exercise of their constitutionally-
protected right of religious nonconformity. But since flag saluting and biology
are generally considered to be acts of secular conduct there is no requirement
that the school discontinue the activity.
Where, however, an act of devotion or religious commitment is involved, the
situation is entirely different. If the Bible is read not as a work of literature
but as the word of God, the First Amendment places it outside the jurisdiction
of government, and the practice might not constitutionally be engaged in even
if there were no objection on the part of any parent and even if the public
school community were religiously homogeneous.
Professor Boles' chapter, "Religious Group Attitudes and Pressure," is per-
haps the best in the book, although here too he makes a number of egregious
errors. He notes one of the most interesting phenomena in American religious
history-the almost complete turnabout of American Catholicism on the issue
of religious teachings and practices in the public school. For almost a century
the Catholic Church and community had been perhaps the chief opponent of
religion in the public schools, and the secularization of American public edu-
cation is in large measure attributable to church-instigated or encouraged liti-
gation by Catholic parents and to other forms of Catholic action. Today the
situation is completely reversed, and it is the organs of the Catholic Church
that are most articulate in attacking secularism in public education and defend-
ing religious teachings and practices in the public schools. The factors that may
have caused this complete reversal are unfortunately not explored by Professor
Boles.
The chapter on "Educator Attitudes" is rather meagre and dated. True,
there is not too much published literature on current educators' views on re-
ligion in the public schools but there is enough available for a treatment of the
subject less superficial than that contained in this book. However, the fact that
the views of educators is deemed relevant in a book devoted largely to the law
marks a degree of progress. In most of the court cases on the subject of religion
in the public schools that this reviewer has tried he has found trial courts to
have an unconcealed impatience with, if not hostility to, the views of public
educators. A trial judge who welcomes expert opinion in the field of medicine
or mechanics generally resents it in the field of education. He deems the ques-
tion of religion in the public schools exclusively one of law and does not recog-
nize the possibility that ascertainment of that law may be helped by a con-
sideration of the educational consequences of the assailed practice.
On the whole it may be said that Professor Boles' book manifests a recog-
nition of the relevance and importance of the less obviously legalistic aspects
of religion in public education. For this we should be grateful although his
treatment of these aspects still leaves much room for further consideration.
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